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Note 
 
Hold Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: Federal 
Administrative Agencies and the Need for Brady 
Disclosure 
Justin Goetz∗ 
Perhaps never before had a single commodity broker 
caused such a stir. In March of 1993, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) accused Lawrence J. Bilello, a 
registered floor broker on the Commodity Exchange, Inc., of en-
gaging in fraudulent trading.1 From such humble and obscure 
facts grew a monster of a case, spanning over four and a half 
years of prehearing posturing.2 Throughout this span, accord-
ing to the court, the CFTC Division of Enforcement brought 
three “screeching halt[s]” to the proceedings through dilatory 
motions or conduct,3 including a failure to comply with a court 
rule to disclose exculpatory information.4 At a conference in ad-
vance of the proceeding, counsel for the Division went so far as 
to tell the court that it would have to “assume” that substantial 
records suspected by the court as being exculpatory did not re-
quire disclosure, essentially forcing the court to trust the body 
prosecuting the claim to decide whether to disclose the evi-
dence.5 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007, 
South Dakota State University. I am thankful for the indispensable insights of 
James Johnson and Professor Gregory Shaffer. Special thanks are due to the 
Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Jeremy Harrell, El-
sa Bullard, and Reed Schuster. Most of all, I am indebted to my lovely wife, 
Alison; my parents, James and Angie; and fellow travelers, Jessie Oh, John 
Fink, and Giano Fanelli for their support and good humor. Copyright © 2011 
by Justin Goetz. 
 1. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Accepts 
Settlement Offer of Lawrence J. Bilello (June 30, 1998), available at http:// 
www.cftc.gov/opa/enf98/opa4161-98.htm. 
 2. See Bilello, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *2 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 1, 1997). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. at *3–4. 
 5. See id. at *3 n.17. 
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A court order eventually brought the release of the excul-
patory information for Mr. Bilello,6 but this turn of events was 
not a reflection of his strong case.7 Instead, as the court order 
notes, the CFTC’s adoption of the Brady rule required that the 
Division of Enforcement release this information.8 This rule, 
derived from the landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland,9 
states that prosecutors who fail to disclose evidence “material 
to guilt or punishment” violate the due process rights of defend-
ants.10 By adopting the Brady rule, the CFTC is relatively 
unique among federal agencies in its liberal discovery proce-
dure,11 a fact that casts a glaring light upon the procedural due 
process protections of other federal administrative agencies. 
The generous discovery authority in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) does not bind these agencies.12 Federal 
agencies are not required to provide discovery in adjudica-
tions—whether formal or informal—unless otherwise provided 
in their rules of procedure.13 Yet federal administrative agen-
cies, whether in preparation for litigation or not, gather large 
amounts of information as regulators—and all of it comes from 
potential defendants.14 This asymmetry of information poses a 
 
 6. Id. at *11–12. 
 7. Ironically, the information did not exonerate him. Press Release, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 1. 
 8. See Bilello, 1997 WL 693557, at *3; First Guar. Metals, Co., Nos. 79-
55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *8 (C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980). 
 9. Bilello, 1997 WL 693557, at *4. 
 10. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Brady Court only ap-
plied the “disclosure” requirement to criminal proceedings in Article III courts. Id. 
 11. At least five administrative agencies have adopted the Brady rule. 
These include the CFTC; the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (17 
C.F.R. § 201.230(b)(2) (2009)); the Federal Maritime Commission (Exclusive 
Tug Franchises, No. 01-06, 2001 WL 1085431, at *5–6 (F.M.C. Aug. 14, 2001)); 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (First Guar. Bank, No. FDIC-95-
65e, 1997 WL 33774615, at *2 (F.D.I.C. Apr. 7, 1997)); and, most recently, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (Policy Statement on Disclo-
sure of Exculpatory Materials, 129 FERC ¶ 61,248 (2009), available at http:// 
www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2009/121709/m-2.pdf ). 
 12. See Katzson Bros. v. EPA, 839 F.2d 1396, 1399 (10th Cir. 1988); Hess 
& Clark v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Of course, administrative 
agencies are not bound by the same details of procedure as the courts.”). 
 13. Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 893 F.2d 1468, 1484 (3d Cir. 
1990); MODEL ADJUDICATION RULES § 230 cmt. 1 (1994).  
 14. Bilello is an example of an agency request for documents in prepara-
tion for litigation. The Division requested information on “[t]he authenticity 
and meaning of thousands of business records and notations relating to the 83 
pairs of trades in issue,” resulting in “over 4,300 requests.” Bilello, 1997 WL 
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problem of fundamental fairness for defendants. Within the 
thousands of pages of data reported to these administrative 
bodies, it becomes difficult for even the most sophisticated de-
fendant to find the information sufficient for exoneration.15 
While defendants seek this exonerating information, the prose-
cutor’s wealth of investigative resources, her head start in piec-
ing together a case, and her ability to compel testimony can all 
place the defendant at a distinct disadvantage.16 Finally, if his-
tory is any indication, the responsibilities of administrative 
agencies will continue to grow17 and federal agencies will con-
tinue to erode formal procedural due process protections for de-
fendants,18 thereby exacerbating this problem. 
In light of this situation, and these aggravating factors, 
this Note suggests that administrative agencies need to hold 
agency enforcement authorities to a constitutionally based19 
Brady-disclosure standard for their formal adjudicatory pro-
ceedings.20 Part I examines the underlying justifications of dis-
 
693557, at *2 n.1 (citing Bilello, No. 93-5, 1994 WL 97075 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 25, 
1994) (order granting review)). 
 15. Indeed, these agencies collect so much data that they may not be able 
to keep track of it all. See, e.g., Mark Latham, Environmental Liabilities and the 
Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for Improved Disclosure of Climate Change-
Related Risks, 39 ENVTL. L. 647, 677 (2009) (referencing the SEC in particular). 
 16. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475–76 & n.9 (1973) (citing Note, 
Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1018–
19 (1972)). The Court further stated that a diligent prosecutor “will have re-
moved much of the evidence from the field” before the defendant is informed of 
the charges against him as a justification for implementing the Brady rule. 
See id. at 476 n.9. 
 17. See Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A 
Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 298 (2001) 
(“In fact, agency creation and expansion of existing agency authority have 
tended to occur during periods of national crisis or favorable political conditions, 
when progressive presidents enjoyed majorities in both houses of Congress.”). 
 18. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and 
the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 496–97, 500–02 (2003) (noting 
the evolution of administrative agencies from formal to informal adjudication, 
and the concomitant loss of procedural due process rights). 
 19. See Bilello, 1997 WL 693557, at *12 (“Brady disclosure rests on an in-
dependent basis from discovery, constitutional due process. As a result, it does 
not automatically follow that limits on discovery also limit Brady disclosure. 
In addition, Brady is a constitutional right and, as such, it cannot be limited 
as easily as discovery.”). 
 20. This Note advocates specifically for applying the Brady rule to formal 
adjudications because judicial, trial-like hearings fall within their scope, while 
nontrial hearings, such as licensing and waiver proceedings, generally fall 
outside their scope and into the category of informal adjudications. See Levy & 
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 499. 
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closure in the Brady ruling, provides a survey of administrative 
bodies’ dispositions towards disclosure, and describes the dis-
covery procedures available in these bodies relative to the level 
of protection required in Brady. Part II explains why the Brady 
rule should apply to administrative agencies, and it synthesizes 
the rationale of agencies that have not adopted the rule and the 
problems that ensue from a lack of disclosure. Part III elabo-
rates upon the need for the Brady rule in federal administra-
tive proceedings, defends it from potential criticism, and sug-
gests that the Supreme Court should require the Brady rule’s 
application to all federal agency formal adjudications. This 
Note concludes by pointing out that while concepts of equal 
treatment of private defendants against government prosecu-
tion provide the impetus for agency adoption of this rule, the 
most compelling reason to adopt the Brady rule is to ensure 
public confidence in the instruments of government. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRADY RULE AND THE 
RESPONSE OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES   
Over the span of three decades, from its decision in Brady 
until its holding in Kyles v. Whitley,21 the U.S. Supreme Court 
refined the concept of prosecutorial disclosure.22 While federal 
courts applied Brady and its successors—broadening the 
bounds of disclosure in the process23—administrative agencies 
conducted a concurrent debate as each agency received Brady 
challenges to its rules of discovery. This Part begins with a pro-
file of Brady and subsequent decisions, followed by an analysis 
of selected administrative agencies, their discovery rules, and 
why they chose to adopt (or not to adopt) the Brady rule. 
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE: BRADY AND ITS 
PROGENY IN THE COURTS 
Brady arose as a petition by the State from the postconvic-
tion relief granted to Mr. Brady by the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, which found that suppression of evidence by the prosecu-
tion was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
 
 21. 514 U.S. 419, 432–34 (1995). 
 22. See Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Constitutional Duty of Federal 
Prosecutor to Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. FED. 
401, 401 (1999). 
 23. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 432. 
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Fourteenth Amendment.24 Affirming this finding, the Supreme 
Court hearkened to an inscription on the façade of the Depart-
ment of Justice Building: “The United States wins its point 
whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”25 According 
to the Court, in the interest of justice, prosecutorial suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence “violates due process . . . irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”26 The 
Court, however, limited the due process violation to encompass 
only nondisclosure of “material” evidence.27 Most important, 
the Court never explicitly stated that the Brady rule applies to 
civil claims,28 an omission used by subsequent courts to deny 
Brady’s application to civil proceedings.29 
In United States v. Agurs,30 the first Supreme Court case to 
consider the details of applying the Brady rule, the Court ad-
dressed the relative ambiguity of the materiality standard and 
the types of situations in which courts could apply Brady.31 Ac-
cording to the Court, Brady applies in three situations. First, 
prosecutors must divulge material evidence indicating that a 
witness perjured his or her testimony.32 Second, prosecutors 
 
 24. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). This protection was en-
shrined in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 114 (1976). 
 25. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (finding a due process violation comprises only nondisclosures in 
which “the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”). 
 28. The Supreme Court has applied the Brady rule only to criminal cases. 
See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 432 (first-degree murder); United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 670 (1985) (criminal drug offense); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 100, 107 
(second-degree murder); Brady, 373 U.S. at 84, 86 (first-degree murder). 
 29. The case most often cited for this proposition is Demjanjuk v. Pe-
trovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court, however, left 
Brady’s application to civil cases an “open issue,” thus making Demjanjuk’s 
proposition less secure. See United States ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), 209 
F.R.D. 475, 482–83 (D. Utah 2001). Only two federal courts have declared that 
the Brady rule applies to a civil claim—both of which arose as civil claims 
brought by federal administrative agencies. See Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. 
FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“Presumably, the essentials of 
due process at the administrative level [in civil cases] require similar disclo-
sures by the agency where consistent with public interest . . . .”). Federal cases 
that treat civil and criminal cases differently cite reasons independent of any 
textual analysis of Brady. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 
969 (4th Cir. 1985) (“An action for violations of the National Labor Relations 
Act is civil in nature, does not involve potential incarceration and violation of 
the Act does not carry with it the stigma of a criminal conviction.”).  
 30. 427 U.S. at 97. 
 31. Id. at 106–07. 
 32. Id. at 103. 
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must divulge material evidence specifically requested before 
trial by defense counsel.33 Finally, the prosecutor must disclose 
this evidence even if the defense counsel makes only a general, 
nonspecific request for exculpatory evidence.34 The Agurs Court 
found that Brady defined “material” evidence as information 
that creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.35 In 
United States v. Bagley36 and Kyles37 the two most recent cases 
detailing Brady, the Court retained a liberal materiality stand-
ard for knowing use of perjured testimony,38 but applied a more 
restrictive “reasonable probability” standard for both general 
and specific requests for evidence by the defense.39 
This line of cases builds the Brady rule into an essential 
element of procedural due process whose general language 
seemingly applies to both criminal and civil government prose-
cutions. This rule calls for prosecutors to disclose all evidence—
whether by specific, general, or no request from the defend-
ant—that is material to the case at issue, including evidence 
that impeaches a witness for the prosecution.40 The most recent 
Supreme Court precedent defines material evidence as that 
which, if absent, casts doubt that the defendant’s trial and ver-
dict are “worthy of confidence.”41 Most importantly, the Brady 
rule arguably sets forth a key due process standard: a legal sys-
 
 33. Id. at 104. 
 34. Id. at 106–07. The Court decided to include this generous third situa-
tion, noting that “[i]n many cases . . . exculpatory information in the posses-
sion of the prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel.” Id. at 106. 
 35. Id. at 112–13 (“It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates 
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been 
committed . . . . If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the 
additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial.”). 
 36. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 37. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 38. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680. The Court took this stance because such be-
havior involves “a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 39. The Court held that if there is a “reasonable probability” that, without 
counsel’s suppression of the evidence, “the result of the proceeding would have 
been different,” the evidence is material. Id. at 682 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). The Court in Kyles redirected the 
standard toward a more liberal construction of materiality. The Court defined 
“reasonable probability” not as a reasonable probability “of a different result,” 
but rather in the absence of evidence, whether the defendant received a “trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. The Kyles 
Court did not touch the standard of materiality applied by Bagley for perjured 
testimony. Id. at 433 n.7. 
 40. Agurs, 427 U.S at 103, 104, 106–07. 
 41. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. 
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tem violates due process if it allows the prosecution, even in 
good faith, to suppress any evidence material to the guilt or 
punishment of a defendant.42 
Ultimately, only a couple of courts acknowledge that Brady 
may apply to purely civil proceedings.43 In Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co. v. FTC, a trading stamp company sought broad discov-
ery privileges in an enforcement action brought by the FTC.44 
The hearing examiner and the Commission denied this request, 
and the company brought its appeal to federal district court.45 
While the district court denied the extension of the Brady rule 
to Sperry in particular, citing the fact that the request was too 
preliminary, the court did uphold the concept of extending the 
Brady rule to civil prosecutions.46 Although subsequent courts 
have not followed the Southern District Court of New York’s 
reasoning,47 Judge van Pelt Bryan’s logic is straightforward:  
There is no question that due process requires the prosecution in a 
criminal case to disclose evidence in its possession which may be help-
ful to the accused. Presumably, the essentials of due process at the 
administrative level require similar disclosures by the agency where 
consistent with the public interest. In civil actions, also, the ultimate 
objective is not that Government “shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.”48 
 
 42. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 43. See Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966). Coincidentally, this case suggests that Brady-like disclosure might be 
required for administrative proceedings. Only one other court has declared 
that principles derived from the Brady rule may apply to wholly civil enforce-
ment proceedings, again referencing administrative proceedings, and using 
the same logic as Judge van Pelt Bryan. See EEOC v. Los Alamos Construc-
tors, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 & n.5 (D.N.M. 1974). Surprisingly, lower 
federal courts have been reticent to extend the Brady rule to civil government 
prosecutions. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6th Cir. 1993); see 
also supra notes 24–25. However, those few cases upsetting this rule each 
share the same quality: they blend traditional elements of criminal prosecu-
tions within a civil enforcement context. See, e.g., Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 353. 
These cases also include civil rights claims stemming from criminal investiga-
tions brought by defendants. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Er-
ror, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 69–75. 
 44. Sperry, 256 F. Supp. at 139. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 142 (citations omitted). 
 47. See United States ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), 209 F.R.D. 475, 
482–83 (D. Utah 2001) (reading these arguments as dicta and not sufficiently 
supported).  
 48. Sperry, 256 F. Supp. at 142 (quoting Campbell v. United States, 365 
U.S. 85, 96 (1961)). In essence, this Note provides the analysis that the Re-
dacted court needed to affirm Sperry. 
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Judge van Pelt Bryant’s reasoning forms the fundamental 
premise of this Note. As the next section reflects, this logic is 
one of the most salient arguments in favor of placing a Brady 
disclosure requirement upon federal administrative agencies. 
B. THE BRADY RULE AND DISCOVERY: A SURVEY OF FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEDURES 
Over the years, numerous parties have made arguments 
invoking the Brady rule before multiple federal agencies.49 
Nonetheless, most agencies do not include the rule in their pro-
cedures for formal adjudication.50 As this section highlights, 
these cases reveal the prevailing arguments for and against 
agency adoption of the Brady rule. Additionally, the methods of 
discovery adopted by agencies in lieu of the rule may serve as a 
useful basis for comparison.51 A suitable analysis begins, how-
ever, with a look at existing norms uniting federal administra-
tive agency procedures.  
1. Rules of Discovery in Formal Federal Agency Adjudication 
Generally 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) lists the statutory 
requirements for formal adjudicatory procedures in federal ad-
ministrative agencies.52 Agencies, however, can add further 
procedural rights to these provisions if they so choose.53 This is 
a necessity if the agency wants to allow formal discovery, as the 
APA does not expressly provide for it.54 As a result, discovery 
regimes tend to vary greatly across agencies, and many agen-
cies have resisted outside pressure to create a uniform set of 
rules.55 Partly in response to this diversity and the need to 
 
 49. Other cases not profiled in this Note include Tiger Shipyard, Inc., No. 
96-3, 1999 WL 1631889 (E.P.A. Apr. 21, 1999), and George T. Hernreich Trad-
ing, 34 F.C.C.2d 708 (1972) (memorandum opinion and order). 
 50. The only other agencies adopting the Brady rule not profiled here are 
the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See supra note 11.  
 51. For example, the two agencies profiled in this Note as rejecting the 
Brady rule have discovery procedures that are otherwise more restrictive than 
those of agencies that have adopted the rule. Compare infra notes 69–74, 80–
82, and accompanying text, with infra notes 88, 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 52. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(b)–(d), 556(b)–(e) (2006). 
 53. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236 n.6 (1973). 
 54. McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 55. Cf. Michael P. Cox, The Model Adjudication Rules (MARs), 11 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 75, 75–76 (1994) (“In general, the responses from the agencies 
did not support the development of uniform rules . . . .”). 
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amend agency rules, the Administrative Conference of the 
United States adopted the Model Adjudication Rules (MARs) 
with agency input.56 The discovery provisions in the MARs bor-
row substantially from the FRCP.57 Although the MARs are in-
tended to provide greater due process protections and uniformi-
ty, their explicit impact has been marginal.58  
Absent the APA and MARs, the only other major legal in-
strument uniting agency procedures is the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), which helps to define the available scope of 
discovery.59 In particular, FOIA provides uniform statutory 
privileges for government attorneys to withhold interagency 
memoranda or letters.60 Courts interpret this privilege as con-
veying the same privileges afforded evidence and documents 
protected from discovery in civil procedures.61 Even so, FOIA 
informs little else regarding agency adjudicatory procedure.62 
Because of the limited practical impact of these uniform 
elements upon federal administrative procedure, a description 
of individual agencies’ discovery procedures is more useful. The 
following section compares the discovery procedures of agencies 
that have adopted the Brady rule and those that have not, and 
their respective justifications. 
 
 56. Id. at 75–77. 
 57. MODEL ADJUDICATION RULES, supra note 13, § 230 cmts. 1, 3; Cox, su-
pra note 55, at 103 (“Rule 26(a) [Discovery Methods], FRCP and Rule 26(d) 
[Sequence and Timing], FRCP provide the basic pattern for agency rules deal-
ing with the subject.”); id. (“Rule 26(b) [Scope of Discovery], FRCP, provides 
the basic pattern for agency rules on this subject.”). 
 58. Only one administrative agency rulemaking docket has referenced the 
MARs. See Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 35,833, 59 SEC Docket 
1170, 1189–90, 1203 (June 9, 1995). 
 59. FOIA both defines, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (d) (2006), and limits, id. 
§ 552(b)–(c), the scope of discoverable information for defendants. See general-
ly Freedom of Information Act, id. § 552. For examples of how FOIA impacts 
agency procedure, see 18 C.F.R. § 385.410 (2009) (FERC); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 22.19(e)(5) (2009) (EPA); 49 C.F.R. § 511.45(a) (2009) (Nat’l Highway Traffic 
Safety Admin.); Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality 
Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1074 (2007) (detailing how FOIA influences 
what government lawyers can disclose or withhold in a proceeding); Morell E. 
Mullins, Manual for Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES 1, 43 n.125 (2003) (discussing how FOIA applies to private litigation 
involving the federal government). 
 60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
 61. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 917 F.2d 571, 573 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). These protections include the civil work product doctrine and 
the attorney-client privilege. Id. (citation omitted). 
 62. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
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2. Administrative Agencies That Deny the Application of the 
Brady Rule 
A number of agencies have refused to adopt the Brady 
rule,63 and this section provides an overview of the reasons for 
that refusal by highlighting two individual agencies’ justifica-
tions. The diversity of the alternative discovery regimes pro-
vides further insight as to why these agencies have rejected 
Brady. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) refuses to 
adopt the Brady rule for its administrative proceedings.64 The 
formative case on the USDA’s refusal to apply the Brady rule 
involved a Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) administrative 
proceeding.65 To justify the decision, the judge cited the funda-
mental differences between Brady and claims brought under 
the PSA, noting that Brady involved malum in se, or actions 
that are inherently wrong, and the PSA case involved malum 
prohibitum, or acts unlawful only by virtue of statute.66 The 
court also noted that, in criminal cases, witnesses can be “un-
savory” or lie, while in PSA cases, “witnesses are generally rep-
utable citizens.”67 Finally, the court held that there was no 
Brady evidence (i.e., exculpatory evidence) gathered in PSA in-
vestigations.68  
 
 63. Tiger Shipyard, Inc., CERCLA 106(B) Petition No. 96-3, 1999 WL 
1631889, at *2 (EAB 1999) (EPA); George T. Hernreich Trading, 34 F.C.C.2d 
708 (1972); Allied Chem. Corp., 75 F.T.C. 1055, 1056 (1969); Local 259, United 
Auto., 276 N.L.R.B. 276, 296 (1985); Miguel A. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. 820, 
857 (U.S.D.A. 1983). 
 64. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 821 (“The Brady doctrine . . . does not ap-
ply to administrative disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 65. Id. at 857 (“[T]he Brady doctrine should not be applied in administra-
tive proceedings under the Packers and Stockyards Act.”). 
 66. By definition, administrative regulatory authority constitutes malum 
prohibitum. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) 
(“[R]egulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power 
where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some so-
cial betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala 
in se.”). Thus, the distinction made in Machado essentially applies to all fed-
eral administrative agencies. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 860–61. The judge 
eventually also made the argument that civil claims and criminal charges are 
fundamentally different. See id. at 862. 
 67. See id. at 861. One presumes that the court believes that a penchant 
for witness mendacity must increase the need for exculpatory information.  
 68. Id. at 862. Today, this logic may not apply, as the PSA currently has a 
broad information collection regime within which exculpatory evidence may be 
gathered. See 9 C.F.R. § 201.94 (2009) (obligating a business to provide “any 
information concerning the business of the packer . . . which may be required 
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According to 9 C.F.R. § 202.200, the USDA Uniform Rules 
of Practice (USDA Rules) apply to PSA adjudications.69 In its 
handling of evidence, the USDA Rules provide only a general 
requirement for the government to divulge official records or 
documents “if admissible for any purpose.”70 The only formal 
right of discovery of nontestimony data and records is the right 
to receive “[c]opies of or a list of documents which the party an-
ticipates introducing at the hearing” during a prehearing con-
ference,71 and to request a subpoena for the production of doc-
uments.72 Unlike the FRCP,73 however, the disclosure require-
ments in the USDA Rules are not automatic, and instead 
require a judge’s order.74 Moreover, the USDA Rules fail the 
Brady due process standard—ensuring that prosecuting attor-
neys cannot, even in good faith, withhold exculpatory informa-
tion75—since they dictate no affirmative duty to disclose.  
Another federal agency that rejects the Brady rule is the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Government attor-
neys in formal adjudications before the NLRB are not required 
to disclose exculpatory information to the defense.76 The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Local 259, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America rea-
soned that disclosure is not necessary because of the funda-
mental difference between civil and criminal cases, the fact 
that the general counsel is already duty bound to not knowing-
ly suppress evidence, and the fact that NLRB files must be 
guarded as confidential.77 In North American Rockwell Corp. v. 
NLRB, the court found that applying Brady would be akin to 
demanding that a prosecutor must “comb his file for bits and 
pieces of evidence which conceivably could be favorable to the 
defense” and was thus improper.78 Reinforcing this point 
 
in order to carry out the provisions of the Act . . . .”); id. § 201.100 (detailing 
various records that must be furnished to growers and sellers under the Act). 
 69. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130–.151 (2009).  
 70. Id. § 1.141(h)(5). 
 71. Id. § 1.140(a)(1)(iii). 
 72. See id. § 1.149(a). The subpoena request must indicate the “necessi-
ty[,] . . . competency, relevancy, and materiality” of the request. Id. 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (providing for initial disclosure as a default 
rule). 
 74. 7 C.F.R. § 1.140(a)(1). 
 75. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 76. Local 259, United Auto., 276 N.L.R.B. 276, 296 (1985). 
 77. Id. at 296 & n.91. Note, however, that this “duty” referenced by the 
ALJ is not supported by any authority. See id. 
 78. N. Am. Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 873 (10th Cir. 1968). 
  
2011] ADMINISTRATIVE BRADY DISCLOSURE 1435 
 
beyond any practical or ideological concern, the Local 259 court 
noted that “[t]raditionally, demands for exculpatory informa-
tion from the General Counsel have not been granted” by the 
NLRB.79  
NLRB procedural rules allow for “[t]he Board, or any 
Member thereof” to subpoena “any evidence” under the control 
of either party as requested by any party.80 Access to records, 
however, is particularly narrow in proceedings before the 
NLRB, as one must obtain the General Counsel’s written con-
sent for any documents or witnesses from the regional offices of 
the NLRB, even with a subpoena.81 Conversely, accused parties 
must fully divulge similar information.82 This creates a sizeable 
discrepancy in discovery rights between plaintiff and defend-
ant, in contrast to the norms of equal discovery rights found in 
the FRCP.83 Ultimately, the NLRB provides fewer procedural 
due process protections to defendants in its formal adjudica-
tions than their civil counterparts receive before Article III 
courts. Moreover, its procedural rules clearly do not meet the 
Brady due process standard,84 as all defense evidence requests 
go through the General Counsel, who traditionally does not 
grant requests for exculpatory information, whether in good or 
bad faith.85 
What unites agencies that reject the Brady rule is that 
they afford defendants less procedural due process than what is 
required by the FRCP. This results in two separate standards 
for civil defendants—greater protections in Article III courts 
and lesser protections in the Article I courts hitherto profiled—
 
 79. Local 259, 276 N.L.R.B. at 296. 
 80. 29 C.F.R. § 102.31 (2009). Although this provision applies only to un-
fair labor practices cases, similar provisions apply for all other formal adjudi-
cations governed by the NLRB. E.g., id. § 102.66(c) (outlining the same sub-
poena power for proceedings regarding employee representation). 
 81. See id. § 102.118(a)(1). This curious provision is akin to a district at-
torney having free reign to withhold evidence at will from an order of the court 
(in this case, the Board). For evidence of the broad scope of the General Coun-
sel’s authority, see N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 389 F.2d at 872–73.  
 82. See N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 389 F.2d at 872. 
 83. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (providing equal disclosure obligations 
and rights to both parties). 
 84. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon re-
quest violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 85. Local 259, United Auto., 276 N.L.R.B. 276, 296 (1985) (“Traditionally, 
demands for exculpatory information from the General Counsel have not been 
granted.”). 
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in addition to the substantial differences in due process protec-
tions between Brady criminal defendants and civil enforcement 
defendants. From a fairness perspective, applying the Brady 
rule is a first step toward balancing these discovery standards 
that currently treat classes of civil defendants very differently. 
Moreover, adopting the Brady rule finally gives defendants in 
federal administrative proceedings the breadth of due process 
protection envisioned by the Court in Brady.86 The next section 
profiles two examples of agencies that have adopted the Brady 
rule, each testifying to Brady’s applicability to formal agency 
adjudications. 
3. Administrative Agencies That Accept the Brady Rule 
Five federal agencies embrace the Brady rule,87 but these 
agencies apply it in differing fashions. They also invoke differ-
ent bases of authority to support their applications of the Brady 
rule in formal adjudications. This Note profiles both facets as 
developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the CFTC. 
The SEC adopted the Brady rule in a peculiar and limited 
way. First, the SEC uniquely incorporated the rule as an actual 
rule in its rules of procedure.88 In one of the most recent cases 
defining the application of Brady to SEC proceedings,89 the 
Commission found that the evidence must be material to guilt 
or punishment,90 but that Brady does not “authorize a whole-
sale ‘fishing expedition’ into investigative material,”91 and is 
only designed to “insure that exculpatory material known to 
the [Enforcement] Division is not kept from the respondent.”92 
Second, discovery procedures of formal SEC adjudications mir-
ror many of those agencies previously profiled.93 Although the 
 
 86. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
 87. See supra note 11. 
 88. 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(b)(2) (2009).  
 89. Warren Lammert, Release Nos. 33-8833 & 34-56233, 91 SEC Docket 
756 (Aug. 9, 2007). 
 90. Id. at 761 (quoting Elizabeth Bamberg, Release No. 34-27673, 50 SEC 
Docket 201, 205 (1990) (citation omitted)). 
 91. Id. (citing Orlando Joseph Jett, Release No. 34-36696, 52 SEC Docket 
830, 830 (1996)). 
 92. Id. (quoting David M. Haber, Exchange Act Release No. APR-418, 55 
SEC Docket 3333, 3334 (Feb. 2, 1994)). 
 93. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.230. Like those other agencies—USDA, NLRB, 
FTC—the SEC provides a list of documents that are and are not available for 
inspection by defendants. Id. 
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SEC adopted the Brady rule, it also curtails the application of 
the rule by only forbidding the Division of Enforcement from 
withholding “documents that contain material exculpatory evi-
dence,” but not imposing an affirmative duty to divulge and 
mark such evidence as exculpatory.94 
The CFTC also employs the Brady rule.95 The CFTC 
adopted Brady through adjudicative precedent.96 In its forma-
tive case on the Brady rule, the CFTC found that the rule “is 
not a discovery rule,” but “rather it is a rule of fairness and 
minimum prosecutorial obligation,” and cited its premise as 
rooted in due process grounds.97 The court declared that prose-
cutors should default to disclosure if there is any doubt of ma-
teriality.98 In laying out a rough procedure, the court required 
that any such exculpatory information must either be given to 
the defendant directly, “or provided to the Administrative Law 
Judge, for his determination as to whether it is producible or 
not.”99 Subsequent CFTC proceedings have further defined ex-
culpatory material as “any information that is either favorable 
to the respondent’s theory of the case or would tend to under-
mine the Division’s case.”100 
Discovery procedures for the CFTC are more generous to 
defendants than the agencies profiled in Part I.C.2.101 Though 
the CFTC includes provisions for disclosable and nondisclosable 
material, it substantially limits nondisclosable evidence by nar-
rowing the class of evidence permissibly withheld to informa-
tion from transactions not related to the proceeding, and re-
quiring the listing of all withheld documents.102 
In summary, this Part explored the evolution of the Brady 
rule’s meaning within the Article III courts, and how this doc-
trine affected procedures adopted by noncriminal, non-Article 
 
 94. See id. § 201.230(b)(2). Some commentators view this version of Brady 
as deficient. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A 
Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 
13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 411–12 (2008) (advocating for a “written 
and uniform ‘full-disclosure’ policy for [SEC] enforcement matters”). 
 95. First Guar. Metals, Co., Nos. 79-55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *9 
(C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Bilello, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *5 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 1, 
1997) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)). 
 101. See 17 C.F.R. § 10.42 (2009). 
 102. See id. § 10.42(b)(3)–(4). 
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III courts. A sampling of administrative agencies rejecting the 
Brady rule revealed agencies whose discovery privileges for de-
fendants do not even meet FRCP standards. This relative 
dearth of procedural due process protection likely influences 
the fortunes of defendants. On the other hand, agencies adopt-
ing the Brady rule provide more robust discovery privileges to 
defendants, hewing to the Supreme Court’s admonition that 
the government succeeds in court when its foremost concern is 
in achieving a just outcome.103 With the preceding summary 
implying an inherent inequity in the widely divergent discovery 
regimes of federal agencies, this Note now considers whether 
agencies who fail to adopt the Brady rule sufficiently protect 
the due process rights of defendants.  
II.  IN THE ABSTRACT—WHY FEDERAL AGENCIES 
SHOULD ADOPT THE BRADY DISCLOSURE STANDARD   
Arguments levied by administrative agencies against the 
application of the Brady rule fall into two categories—
arguments premised upon abstract theories of justice and fair-
ness, and arguments that question the practicality of the Brady 
rule as applied.104 While this Note later addresses practical 
concerns, this Part focuses upon the former criticisms. Rebut-
ting these criticisms in turn establishes a theoretical frame-
work in support of the Brady rule’s adoption by federal admin-
istrative agencies. 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES IS 
ARBITRARY IN PURSUING A JUST OUTCOME 
Many of the cases that have denied the civil application of 
the Brady rule justified their decisions by highlighting the fun-
damental difference between criminal and civil claims.105 In 
particular, these cases cited both the nature of the claims 
brought in Brady and its progeny, and the severity of punish-
ment awaiting the defendants in these cases as being “inappo-
 
 103. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 104. For examples of the former, see Tiger Shipyard, Inc., CERCLA 106(B) 
Petition No. 96-3, 1999 WL 1631889, pt. II.A (EAB 1999) (EPA). For the latter, 
see Miguel A. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. 820, 861–62 (U.S.D.A. 1983). 
 105. See George T. Hernreich Trading, 34 F.C.C.2d 708, 711 (1972); Ma-
chado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 860–62; cf. Allied Chem. Corp., 75 F.T.C. 1055, 1056–
57 (1969) (noting the irrelevance of criminal discovery cases to Commission 
proceedings). 
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site” to the administrative proceeding.106 On the matter of pun-
ishment, this critique flows from the idea that with the risk of 
more severe punishment, a court must grant the defendant 
greater procedural protections.107 These courts also draw con-
trasts between the underlying criminal claims in Brady and its 
progeny, and the comparatively mild civil claims at bar in ad-
ministrative proceedings as a way to justify applying Brady to 
the former and not the latter.108  
On punishment, however, Article III courts do not solely 
limit the Brady rule’s application to those instances cited by 
the agency courts rejecting Brady—to capital offenses.109 In-
stead, the Brady rule protects all criminal defendants facing 
federal charges, no matter how mild.110 Not surprisingly, at 
least one Article III court111 and Article I court112 have noted 
that civil punishments can exact harm similar to criminal pun-
ishments. Thus, as a categorical distinction based on punish-
ment, the criminal-civil dichotomy alone fails to justify diver-
gent application of the Brady rule.  
The argument on the differing nature of criminal and civil 
law also rests on a highly abstract premise rooted in substan-
tive law and legal history.113 Practically applied, however, this 
 
 106. Allied Chem., 75 F.T.C. at 1056–57; see also MSC.Software Corp., 134 
F.T.C. 580 (2002); Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 859. 
 107. Cf. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 862 (“[A] criminal conviction can result 
in loss of life, liberty, or citizenship rights, while an administrative order, even 
though severe, cannot result in such losses.”). 
 108. See MSC.Software, 134 F.T.C., pt. V; Allied Chem., 75 F.T.C. at 1056–
57; Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 859. These courts’ arguments on the differing 
natures of criminal and civil law are likely based on the diverging historical 
development of criminal and civil law. Cf. Gilbert v. Johnson, 419 F. Supp. 
859, 877 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (highlighting differences between civil and criminal 
law’s constitutional requirements). 
 109. MSC.Software, 134 F.T.C., pt. V; see also Allied Chem., 75 F.T.C. at 
1056–57. 
 110. See United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) (wire 
fraud); United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (aiding and 
abetting preparation of false federal income tax return); United States v. 
McKellar, 798 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1986) (false statements to lenders). 
 111. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 354 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 112. First Guar. Metals, Co., Nos. 79-55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *9 
(C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980) (“Since [Brady] is premised upon due process 
grounds[,] we hold that its principles are applicable to administrative en-
forcement actions such as this which, while strongly remedial in nature, may 
yield substantial sanctions.” (emphasis added)). 
 113. See Gilbert, 419 F. Supp. at 877. The court dismissed as “axiomatic,” 
without any further explanation, the idea that due process prerequisites for 
criminal trials are not fully applicable to administrative hearings. Id.; see also 
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distinction is inapplicable to the government attorney. For in-
stance, modern commentators justify not extending the Brady 
rule to civil claims by viewing such contests as adversarial be-
tween two private attorneys whose duties are to their clients.114 
These duties drive private attorneys to potentially derail truth 
or take actions that may make the outcome unjust, with the 
idea that by their private adversary doing likewise, just out-
comes may result.115 Government attorneys, in contrast, have a 
responsibility derived from Brady “to seek justice and to devel-
op a full and fair record,” and they should not use the power of 
the government to bring about “unjust settlements or re-
sults.”116 Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly held govern-
ment attorneys to a higher standard in civil litigation than 
their private counterparts.117 These courts base this disparate 
treatment on the premise that government attorneys represent 
the public, and not a private client.118 Logically, then, in terms 
of their duties, agency attorneys or any federal attorney trying 
civil cases is akin to only one other type of attorney—the gov-
ernment attorney trying criminal matters. Both, again, are at 
least bound in theory by the Court’s admonition in Brady that 
the state—the client of the government lawyer119—succeeds 
 
Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: 
Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 211 
(2004). Nevertheless, in applying Brady to select civil claims, at least one Ar-
ticle III court impliedly rejected this justification. Cf. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 
354 (citing the criminal prosecution methodology employed by the prosecution 
in this civil proceeding as partial justification for applying Brady). 
 114. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclo-
sure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 54 (1982).  
 115. Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, 
and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 
796 (2000); Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil 
Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 235 (2000). 
 116. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980). 
 117. See Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 
1277–80 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 
617 F.2d 1365, 1366–70 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 118. See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
THOMAS D. MORGAN, LAWYER LAW 674 (2005). But see Joshua Panas, Note, 
The Miguel Estrada Confirmation Hearings and the Client of a Government 
Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 562 (2004) (contending that the govern-
ment attorney owes his or her ultimate duty to the agency and not the public).  
 119. The State—whether embodied in an office, division, or agency—is the 
client of the government attorney. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 
cmt. 38 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/new_rules/rules.cfm; REGU-
LATIONS OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 165–66 (Stephen Gillers & 
Roy D. Simon eds., 2003).  
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when just outcomes are afforded its citizens.120 This rationale 
creates a simple syllogism: if the same duty binds the two, so 
too should the law similarly bind these attorneys to the same 
duty.121  
Other authorities outside Brady and similar case precedent 
also stand for the similar treatment of civil and criminal gov-
ernment attorneys. For example, the D.C. Rules of Professional 
Conduct treat civil and criminal government attorneys the 
same for purposes of client confidentiality, yet different from 
private attorneys. Government attorneys may divulge informa-
tion their agency clients deem confidential when permitted or 
authorized by law, or when permitted by rules or compelled by 
law or court order.122 Private attorneys, in contrast, can only 
divulge client confidences if permitted by the rules or compelled 
by law or court order.123 The government attorney has greater 
authority to disclose than her private counterpart, and has 
equal discretion regardless of her civil or criminal distinction. A 
plausible justification for this greater ability to disclose confi-
dences is recognition of the Brady concept of the government’s 
success hinging on just outcomes for its citizens. More impor-
tantly, this distinction provides some support for the idea that 
government attorneys should be more prone to disclosure, an 
idea at the heart of Brady as applied in criminal,124 or civil,125 
contexts. 
In summary, the distinctions between civil and criminal 
law asserted to justify rejection of Brady collapse under scruti-
ny. More fundamental distinctions, however, such as those pro-
vided by codes of conduct, cleanly separate government attor-
neys from their private counterparts while uniting civil and 
criminal government attorneys under the same impetus partic-
ular to discovery. Thus, it seems incongruous for agencies to 
not hold government civil attorneys to the same high disclosure 
requirements as their criminal government counterparts, and 
 
 120. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). 
 121. See Berenson, supra note 115, at 789–90; Temkin, supra note 113, at 
211 (“[D]ecisions concerning the duties of prosecutors are based upon the same 
definition of misrepresentation in the Model Code and Model Rules with, to be 
sure, an overlay of criminal law concepts.”). 
 122. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(e)(2)(B) cmt. 37.  
 123. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(e)(2)(A).  
 124. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976). 
 125. Exclusive Tug Franchises, No. 01-06, 2001 WL 1085431, at *4 (F.M.C. 
Aug. 14, 2001) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88). 
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instead place them in the category of the private attorney.126 
Additionally, it seems contradictory for agencies to deny the 
application of the rule to certain federal government attorneys, 
and certain federal legal proceedings, when the maxim that 
underwrites the rule—that the government’s role is “not merely 
to win cases, but to achieve just outcomes”—logically applies to 
all of them.127 This last point is the core of Brady, and forms 
the philosophical basis for a duty to disclose.128 
Federal agencies also justify not adopting the Brady rule 
by citing as sufficient their agency’s existing procedural protec-
tions for defendants. This Note next profiles these protections, 
highlighting their inability to meet the Brady due process 
standard.129 
B. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THEIR 
DERIVATIVES ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR SATISFYING A BRADY 
DISCLOSURE STANDARD, AND ARE THUS INSUFFICIENT FOR 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Administrative agencies are not obligated to provide proce-
dures for discovery in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.130 
Agencies must grant discovery only if “a refusal to do so would 
so prejudice a party as to deny him due process.”131 However, 
one argument made by agencies rejecting Brady is that the dis-
covery provisions available to defendants are sufficient to en-
sure due process for civil defendants.132 These agencies may 
adopt their discovery rules in full or in part from the FRCP.133 
This section broadly analyzes whether FRCP discovery and 
 
 126. At least one commentator, however, believes that the Brady rule 
should also apply to private attorneys. See Frankel, supra note 114, at 54–55. 
 127. See Bilello, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *7 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 1, 1997) 
(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). As Justice Douglas 
noted, a basic principle behind the Brady rule is “‘that the Government wins 
its point when justice is done in its courts.’” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 n.2 (quoting 
Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, Solicitor General, Address at the Judicial Conference 
of the Fourth Federal Circuit (June 29, 1954)). 
 128. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88. 
 129. See id. at 87. 
 130. See Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 549 F.2d 28, 
33 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 131. McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 132. E.g., Miguel A. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. 820, 832–33 (U.S.D.A. 1983).  
 133. Compare, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.31(b) (2009) (listing the FTC procedural 
rules on mandatory initial disclosures), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (pro-
viding the rule on mandatory initial disclosures). 
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other procedural safeguards are adequate alternatives to the 
Brady disclosure for administrative agencies. 
Although the FRCP was amended in 1993 to require great-
er cooperation between opposing counsel,134 adversarial ele-
ments remain, including discovery exemptions for privileged in-
formation and work product.135 Agencies rejecting Brady cite 
these exemptions as justifying their decision and as being an 
important buttress of agency enforcement.136 For courts, how-
ever, the reasons behind protecting the attorney-client privi-
lege—ensuring “full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients”137—or work product must be weighed 
against the interests of society “in accurate judicial fact find-
ing,” among other factors.138 The Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, in weighing these factors, adopted the Brady rule by find-
ing that an agency holding even privileged information 
confidential can subvert the purpose of discovery, which is to 
“avoid surprise and the need for continuances.”139 Although 
agencies may experience some problems in handing over work 
product wholesale,140 because the commission ultimately de-
termines what constitutes exculpatory information, such prob-
lems should be slight.141  
Similarly, federal agencies invoke the Jencks Act,142 a fed-
eral statute requiring agencies to divulge any statements asso-
ciated with the matter on which the witness testified, as a suit-
able alternative to applying Brady.143 The Act, however, only 
applies to one aspect of discovery—requiring the government to 
 
 134. Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1463 (2000). 
 135. Id. at 1464; see also Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific 
Obligations that Follow from Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve 
the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 19 (2003). 
 136. See George T. Hernreich Trading, 34 F.C.C.2d 708, 709–11 (1972); Al-
lied Chem. Corp., 75 F.T.C. 1055, 1056–57 (1969); Local 259, United Auto., 
276 N.L.R.B. 276, 296 (1985).  
 137. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
 138. N. Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
 139. Exclusive Tug Franchises, No. 01-06, 2001 WL 1085431, at *3 (F.M.C. 
Aug. 14, 2001). 
 140. See Miguel A. Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. 820, 833–34 (U.S.D.A. 1983). 
 141. For an example of a commission playing this role effectively, see Bilel-
lo, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *11–13 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 1, 1997). 
 142. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006). 
 143. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Corp., 75 F.T.C. 1055, 1057–58 (1969). 
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disclose any statements made by witnesses.144 In addition to 
these limitations in scope, the Jencks Act has substantial prac-
tical limitations. The Act only gives the judge the authority to 
direct the government attorney to deliver the “Jencks materi-
al,” while providing little recourse if she does not comply.145 
Moreover, the Act does not deem attorney work product to be a 
disclosable “statement,” no matter how exculpatory the evi-
dence may be.146 Further, courts can only direct government 
counsel to divulge Jencks information after the witness testifies 
on direct examination.147 Commentators note that, as a result, 
“frequent delays and adjournments” in the proceeding are like-
ly to ensue, and a comprehensive investigation of the informa-
tion may be impossible with the brief time usually given by 
courts.148 By requiring pretrial disclosure of all exculpatory 
evidence, including witness testimony, agencies could avoid 
these delays and an otherwise short time frame for analyzing 
the exculpatory information would not burden the defense 
counsel. 
Finally, critics of a civil Brady rule may contend that agen-
cies’ adoption of FRCP discovery rules is sufficient to allow 
access to all nonwitness exculpatory information, particularly if 
the agency adopts the mandatory initial disclosure require-
ment.149 The language most pertinent to this argument is in 
FRCP Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), requiring both parties to divulge all 
materials supporting their claims.150 This disclosure require-
ment suffers from three flaws. First, the defendant only gets to 
see the portion of the material the agency will use in its case—
that which incriminates her—instead of the larger body of in-
 
 144. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
 145. See Machado, 42 Agric. Dec. at 820. 
 146. See id. 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); United States v. Avellino, 129 F. Supp. 2d 214, 
218 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 148. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restric-
tions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1991). 
 149. For an example of an agency with this provision and lacking Brady, 
see 16 C.F.R. § 3.31(b) (2009) (FTC). 
 150. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (“[A] party must, without awaiting a dis-
covery request, provide to the other parties: . . . a copy—or a description . . . of 
all . . . information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its 
possession, . . . and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use 
would be solely for impeachment . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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formation that may exonerate her.151 Second, agency employees 
can be aware of information that may be exculpatory, yet they 
may not feel compelled by initial disclosure to comply because 
they subjectively determine the evidence does not materially 
affect the case.152 Third, it is the defense counsel, and not the 
government attorney, who has the most knowledge as to what 
evidence is exculpatory to their client’s case; thus the attorney 
who decides to disclose is not the attorney who is most qualified 
to make that decision.153 Notice that each of these shortcomings 
arises from FRCP disclosure resting upon the discretion of the 
adverse party. Each also strains the credibility of the argument 
that the FRCP would provide civil defendants due process pro-
tection that meets the Brady standard.  
In summary, critical analysis of the abstract arguments 
against agency adoption of Brady reveals their flaws. The fun-
damental distinctions between criminal and civil government 
attorney duties are indeed fewer than those between govern-
ment and private attorneys, spurning the convention that civil 
government and private attorneys must have more similar dis-
covery duties between them than between criminal and civil 
government attorneys. Alternative discovery regimes to Brady 
currently used by agencies also suffer from deficiencies.  
In totality, these last two Parts paint a clear picture. Part I 
noted that numerous federal agencies do not meet the FRCP 
standard for discovery, demonstrating that civil defendants’ 
due process rights depend entirely upon whether litigants pur-
sue their claims in Article III or Article I courts. Part II makes 
this basic inequality even starker by concluding that a higher 
standard of justice guides the government attorney in prosecut-
ing any claim for the government regardless of the claim. Coin-
cidentally, this same standard informed the Supreme Court’s 
creation of the Brady rule. Building on this foundation, the 
next section details what basic Brady regime characteristics all 
federal administrative agencies should adopt. 
 
 151. See Exclusive Tug Franchises, No. 01-06, 2001 WL 1085431, at *4 
(F.M.C. Aug. 14, 2001) (applying Brady specifically on this issue). 
 152. See First Guar. Metals, Co., Nos. 79-55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *5–6 
(C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980) (applying Brady specifically on this issue). 
 153. Exclusive Tug, 2001 WL 1085431, at *5 (quoting Dennis v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966)).  
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III.  PRACTICAL APPLICATION—A BRADY DISCLOSURE 
RULE THAT BALANCES DUE PROCESS AND EFFICIENT 
ENFORCEMENT   
In order to construct a proper Brady standard for federal 
agencies, this Part summarizes the most effective characteris-
tics of the Brady rule as developed by Article III courts and 
federal agencies. 
A. CONSTRUCTING A BRADY RULE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES 
To restate, a Brady disclosure standard requires govern-
ment attorneys prosecuting a case to divulge “material” excul-
patory information.154 The U.S. Supreme Court defined “mate-
riality” as based upon the “reasonable probability” that in its 
absence, the resulting verdict would not be “worthy of confi-
dence.”155 Government attorneys must divulge this exculpatory 
information in essentially all instances.156 
This Note argues in favor of applying the Brady rule to 
formal agency adjudications. This choice is deliberate, rooted in 
the fact that formal adjudications involve the same controver-
sies, trial-type procedures, and entail punishments of similar 
intensity as those provided in Article III criminal courts.157 In 
spite of these similarities, Article III criminal courts generally 
require disclosure of material, exculpatory evidence,158 while 
Article I courts do not.159 This discrepancy in treatment creates 
a fundamental unfairness affecting discovery, which is itself es-
sential to procedural due process,160 and to exposing or deter-
 
 154. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). 
 155. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
 156. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1976) (noting that the 
prosecution must disclose Brady evidence even when the defendant makes no 
request for the information). 
 157. See William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unin-
tended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 269–70 (2009); see also supra notes 
110–12 and accompanying text; cf. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 496 (not-
ing that “formal adjudication typically applies to . . . enforcement actions”). 
 158. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433–34. 
 159. See McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 160. “[D]iscovery is critical to the outcome of litigation because it helps 
frame the issues . . . and expedites the litigation by disclosing disputed and 
undisputed facts, insuring that all relevant facts will be available to the jury 
while guarding against concealed or surprise evidence.” William J. Smith & 
Shelley G. Bryant, A Plaintiff’s View: Motions for Summary Judgment Are Pa-
per Tigers, 2 Ann. 2007 AAJ-CLE 1613 (2007).  
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ring government misconduct.161 Often, these defendants are 
due such procedural due process protections because a property 
interest is at stake in the administrative proceeding,162 thus 
implicating some of the same interests at stake in criminal cas-
es. For these reasons, the need for the Brady rule is particular-
ly evident and suited for agency formal adjudications. 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution compels 
Brady disclosure in a criminal proceeding.163 This Note argues 
that agencies should apply the Brady rule as a constitutionally 
derived provision within their discovery procedures. Without 
this designation, the Brady right could be more easily limited, 
similar to other aspects of discovery, by government attorneys 
invoking common-law or statutory exceptions, thus undermin-
ing the benefits of the rule.164 The SEC, for example, adopted 
the Brady rule without asserting it as a constitutionally based 
standard,165 and the negative result of this choice is a rule that 
forbids the government attorney from withholding exculpatory 
evidence without imposing an affirmative duty to divulge and 
mark such evidence as exculpatory.166 Again, by not placing an 
affirmative duty on the government attorney to disclose the in-
formation, the government attorney can use his discretion to 
determine what is exculpatory, while the defense attorney, who 
has the duty and is most able to discern exculpatory evidence 
by her more comprehensive view of her client’s case, has no 
 
 161. See Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil 
Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 172 (2010) (describing how 
court-supervised discovery plays a significant role in minimizing official mis-
conduct). 
 162. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 
(1972) (noting, for example, that “a person receiving welfare benefits under 
statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an 
interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedur-
al due process”). 
 163. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 114 (1976); cf. Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (agreeing that the State’s withholding of ex-
culpatory evidence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
 164. See Bilello, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *10 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 1, 1997). 
These include exemptions from deliberative privilege, id. at *11 n.81, attorney 
work product, id. at *11 n.79, and where production of evidence is otherwise a 
prosecutorial decision, id. at *4 n.25; see also 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 254, at 81 & n.60 (2d ed. 1982) (“Be-
cause [Brady] is based on the Constitution, it overrides court-made rules of 
procedure.”). 
 165. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(b)(2) (2009). 
 166. Cf. supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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role.167 This dynamic could make a similarly constructed Brady 
rule a “rule of disclosure” in name alone, and it clearly goes 
against the Brady due process standard holding that prosecut-
ing attorneys should not be able to withhold, even in good faith, 
exculpatory evidence.168 
The CFTC provides a better model. This agency, like any 
other federal agency, is able to interpret the Constitution with-
in the purview of authority granted by Congress.169 The CFTC, 
in First Guaranty Metals, relied on the logic of the Brady 
Court—that the Brady rule “is premised upon due process 
grounds.”170 By extension, the CFTC reasoned that such prin-
ciples apply to CFTC enforcement actions in a manner akin to 
Brady—not merely as a “discovery rule” but as a “rule of fair-
ness and minimum prosecutorial obligation,” intimating its 
deeper roots.171 Subsequent CFTC courts cited this precedent 
as grounds for requiring that Enforcement Division attorneys 
divulge material, exculpatory evidence, even though agency at-
torneys argued that work-product privilege required them to 
withhold the information.172 In practice, a judge in an in cam-
era inspection is the ultimate authority in deciding whether 
evidence embedded within otherwise privileged documents is 
exculpatory.173 Nothing bars other federal agencies from em-
ploying a similar, constitutionally based system. 
In order to meet the Brady due process standard, then, a 
Brady rule applicable to agency formal adjudications must be 
rooted in the U.S. Constitution, as evidenced by the SEC’s 
shortcomings. Agencies must not allow their enforcement divi-
sion prosecutors to assert common-law privileges or their own 
discretion in subverting disclosure of exculpatory evidence. To 
allay the fears of prosecutors divulging sensitive records of 
 
 167. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966) (“The determi-
nation of what may be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be 
made only by an advocate.”). 
 168. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 169. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (citing 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)). 
 170. First Guar. Metals, Co., Nos. 79-55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *9 
(C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980). 
 171. Id. (citing United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 172. See, e.g., Bilello, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *11–12 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 
1, 1997). 
 173. For instance, this is the same system recently adopted by the FERC. 
See Policy Statement on Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials, 129 FERC 
61,248 (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/ 
2009/121709/m-2.pdf . 
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marginal exculpatory value, the judge can determine whether 
the sensitivity of the records outweighs the constitutional obli-
gation to divulge exculpatory evidence. Most of all, agencies 
must adopt a Brady rule that creates the affirmative duty for 
prosecutors to divulge material, exculpatory evidence. In so 
doing, agencies can balance countervailing concerns of en-
forcement integrity and defendants’ needs for exculpatory in-
formation, all while adhering to Brady. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THAT FEDERAL 
AGENCIES ADOPT THE BRADY RULE 
After determining the most effective standard, the question 
then becomes how to achieve this standard through the most 
effective means. Three constitutional avenues are available for 
enacting the Brady rule in each federal agency.  
First, Congress could pass a law amending the APA to re-
quire the Brady rule’s application in all formal adjudications.174 
As the product of a political process, however, congressional 
legislation often creates imperfections on technical matters of 
administrative due process.175 Indeed, Congress created the 
APA only after years of political battles spanning the FDR and 
Truman presidencies.176 The APA’s continued survival without 
major change,177 as well as its very creation by Congress, are 
the result of its ambiguous construction.178 The Brady rule, by 
contrast, is a specific, technical, and “controversial”179 judicial 
construction. These qualities make it less likely that Congress 
 
 174. See Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 89, 95 (1996) (“When Congress amends the APA, it adopts procedures 
that apply across the board.”). 
 175. See Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish for: Amending the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1141, 1146 (2004) (noting that 
special interests and political posturing could hijack a congressional amend-
ment to the APA). 
 176. See id. at 1143–45. Oren crystallizes this fact by highlighting Justice 
Jackson’s writing that the APA’s adoption constituted the end of “‘a long pe-
riod of study and strife.’” Id. (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 
33, 40–41 (1950)). 
 177. See William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. South-
ern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the 
Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 999 (2004) 
(“The key provisions of the APA have survived several significant changes in 
regulatory philosophy and the role of judicial review . . . .”). 
 178. See Oren, supra note 175, at 1143–45 (noting that the APA is an “in-
tentionally ambiguous text”). 
 179. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 557.2 (3d ed. 2004). 
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will promulgate a Brady rule amendment within a reasonable 
period of time, if at all. Thus, a combination of legislative fric-
tion and lack of expertise on procedural due process relative to 
the judiciary makes an amendment to the APA a less likely and 
a less effective option. 
A second option involves each federal agency adopting the 
Brady rule individually. This provides the potential for both a 
constitutionally based right and a right tailored to the exigen-
cies of the particular agency, while still ensuring some uniform-
ity between agencies.180 However, the weakness of this ap-
proach is that it relies on the action of each federal agency, a 
number of which have precedents clearly rejecting the applica-
tion of the Brady rule.181 Agency adoption of the rule in the face 
of years of contrary precedent also requires a substantial 
amount of momentum to succeed.182 Additionally, by allowing 
“tailoring” of the rule by various agencies, one also runs the 
risk of creating different due process rights to disclosure across 
agencies, instead of one uniform right.183 Indeed, agencies could 
follow the SEC model and adopt the Brady rule in word, but 
water it down to the point that it violates its spirit.184 Because 
individual agency adoption of the Brady rule suffers from un-
due friction and increases the risk of certain agencies adopting 
nonuniform, weakened Brady disclosure standards, it is not a 
preferred option. 
This Note instead advocates for a third option: the U.S. 
Supreme Court should require federal agencies to adopt the 
Brady rule for formal adjudications. The Supreme Court is the 
superior body for promulgating this regulation, both because of 
its experience in determining what constitutes procedural due 
process,185 and because of its history in defining and applying 
 
 180. See Shapiro, supra note 174, at 95 (noting that when institutions oth-
er than Congress can craft procedures derived from the APA, “[s]uch adjust-
ments can fine-tune the administrative process”). 
 181. See supra note 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 182. In order for such agency changes to survive constitutional scrutiny, 
the agency “must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and 
standards are being deliberately changed.” Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. 
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
 183. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046, 3048 (2010) 
(holding that substantive differences in the treatment of fundamental rights 
between states and the federal government must be limited). 
 184. Cf. supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
 185. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Fusari v. Stein-
berg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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the Brady rule.186 Considering the dynamism of administrative 
law, the courts are generally superior for deciding due process 
issues because parties can repeatedly test and refine court 
standards to the facts of a given case.187 Additionally, a Su-
preme Court mandate would speed the adoption of the Brady 
rule relative to the previous options and ensure a uniform, ro-
bust disclosure requirement.  
The Supreme Court has the constitutional authority to im-
pose a uniform Brady rule upon federal agency formal adjudi-
cations. Administrative agencies may interpret the Constitu-
tion in lieu of contrary court precedent.188 Nevertheless, the 
Court is the ultimate authority on constitutional matters, in-
cluding whether federal agencies must adopt the Brady rule.189 
While the Supreme Court and other Article III courts are lim-
ited in the procedural requirements they can impose upon fed-
eral agencies,190 these courts have a substantially broader abil-
ity to impose procedural requirements on “quasi-judicial” pro-
ceedings191—such as formal adjudications192—when a court 
finds that the due process protections are insufficient.193 Be-
cause the Brady rule derives from the Fifth Amendment,194 it is 
a constitutional constraint, thus making it an exception to the 
Vermont Yankee prohibition on courts imposing additional pro-
cedural requirements on administrative agencies.195  
 
 186. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 187. See Araiza, supra note 177, at 998 (“The advantage of judicially 
crafted tests is that they are constantly tested in litigation, leading to their 
refinement and alteration as agency action evolves.”).  
 188. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (citing 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)).  
 189. See id. (noting that ever since Marbury, the Supreme Court “has re-
mained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text”).  
 190. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 541 (1978) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances it is im-
proper for a reviewing court to prescribe the procedural format an agency 
must follow . . . .”). 
 191. Id. at 542. 
 192. See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8299(b) (1st ed. 2006) (noting that “quasi-judicial 
action” is a term inclusive of “formal adjudication”). 
 193. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542 (“[I]n some circumstances additional 
procedures may be required in order to afford the aggrieved individuals due 
process.”). 
 194. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 114 (1976). 
 195. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543 (noting that, “[a]bsent constitutional 
constraints,” administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own pro-
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court must adopt a Brady rule 
that comports with the due process requirement that prosecu-
tors cannot withhold material, exculpatory information, in good 
faith or otherwise. The Supreme Court is the most effective 
body for ensuring a uniform, authoritative standard. The Court 
has the authority to assert the Brady rule over federal agen-
cies. Some federal agencies have years of experience employing 
the rule,196 and they can provide the Court with models of a 
rule that effectively ensures its procedural protections while 
guaranteeing that defendants do not subvert the legitimate en-
forcement of regulations. By looking to these agencies for guid-
ance, as well as hearkening to its own precedent, the Supreme 
Court can craft an effective Brady rule. 
C. RESPONDING TO THE POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE BRADY 
RULE AS EMPLOYED 
The agencies and courts rejecting the Brady rule’s applica-
tion to civil matters have already made many of the points that 
critics may potentially level against this Note’s proposal. How-
ever, two critiques in particular deserve a direct response, as 
these criticisms question both the practicality and the utility of 
the Brady rule in civil proceedings. By addressing both criti-
cisms, this Note constructs a process for employing the rule in 
formal agency adjudications. 
The Brady rule holds that a failure of government attor-
neys to disclose material information is a due process violation 
“irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion.”197 Thus, unlike the FRCP disclosure requirements,198 if 
the evidence is arguably material, the government attorney 
must err on the side of disclosure.199 Such a seemingly broad 
requirement to disclose lends at least facial credence to the cri-
tique that a Brady requirement would require agencies to dig 
for exculpatory evidence ad absurdum.200 However, Brady is 
 
cedural rules). 
 196. The SEC has had a disclosure rule akin to Brady for a decade and a 
half. See SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,741 (June 23, 1995). 
The CFTC has enforced the Brady rule for three decades. See First Guar. Met-
als, Co., Nos. 79-55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *8 (C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980). 
 197. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 198. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 199. See Bilello, No. 93-5, 1997 WL 693557, at *4 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 1, 1997) 
(“[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclo-
sure.”). 
 200. See N. Am. Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 873 (10th Cir. 
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limited in scope as applied both in criminal201 and in adminis-
trative contexts.202 An effective standard may be the one 
adopted by the CFTC—limiting disclosure to that information 
which is within the “possession, custody or control of the Com-
mission, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of 
due diligence may become known” to the agency attorney.203 
This standard limits agency enforcement from having to seek 
out information from far-flung sources, and imputes a reasona-
bility factor to the agency’s search for evidence. Moreover, the 
fact that five federal agencies continue to enforce some version 
of the Brady rule204 suggests that, at the very least, the costs of 
the rule do not outweigh the benefits.  
Another criticism of Brady is that prosecutors will with-
hold a large amount of evidence favorable to the defendant in 
the belief that an appellate court will view the evidence as hav-
ing no “reasonable probability” of affecting the original ver-
dict.205 This critique ignores Kyles206 and overlooks the fact that 
the criminal Brady requirements, though self-enforced, work 
remarkably well.207 Many government attorneys even go sub-
stantially beyond these constitutional obligations to provide de-
fendants with additional information.208 This success level can 
be explained in a number of ways—government attorneys will 
 
1968) (acknowledging that some prosecutors view Brady as requiring them to 
comb their files for any bits of information that might conceivably be favorable 
to the defense). 
 201. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976) (“‘[T]hey are under 
no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they learn about the 
case and about their witnesses.’” (quoting In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6, 14 (1963))). 
 202. See Bilello, 1997 WL 693557, at *5–6; see also First Guar. Metals, Co., 
Nos. 79-55 to -57, 1980 WL 15696, at *7 (C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980). 
 203. First Guar. Metals, Co., 1980 WL 15696, at *8. The CFTC likely bor-
rowed this standard, in part, from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(i), 16(a)(1)(F)(i)–(ii). 
 204. See supra note 11. 
 205. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 685, 715–16 (2006) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 206. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (stating that “material-
ity” does not rest upon whether the evidence, if admitted, would have changed 
the outcome, but rather whether in the absence of the evidence, the trial re-
sulted in “a verdict worthy of confidence”). 
 207. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law With-
out Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and 
Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 715 (2006). 
 208. Id. (“[M]any prosecutors—probably most—regularly go well beyond 
their constitutional and statutory obligations of discovery, providing defend-
ants with virtually all information uncovered by law enforcement.”). 
  
1454 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1424 
 
divulge all exculpatory information in order to avoid errors of 
omission that can overturn verdicts;209 government attorneys 
will divulge information because it is either exculpatory and 
material, thereby warranting disclosure; or the information is 
immaterial and thus no harm results from over-disclosing.210 
These are just a few possible explanations. Ultimately, consid-
ering these results and the level of government attorney follow 
through, federal agencies should encourage enforcement attor-
neys to adopt disclosure as a default disposition in bringing a 
formal proceeding as a companion policy to adopting the Brady 
rule. As noted previously, any potential negative consequences 
of this system, such as guilty defendants taking advantage of 
overly generous prosecutorial disclosure, should be addressed 
by a neutral arbiter that would ultimately decide what is ex-
culpatory, admissible evidence.211 
In the end, it is not coincidence that the two arenas of fed-
eral law without a constitutional due process right to discov-
ery—administrative212 and criminal law213—should share, in 
practice, the same constitutional, Brady rule protection against 
the harshness of this lack of right. This commonality intimates 
the importance of the Brady rule in government prosecution of 
criminal claims and, in the few agencies who have adopted it, 
civil claims. An effective Brady rule would ensure that agency 
attorneys cannot dismiss Brady through common-law or statu-
tory means. Moreover, the Brady rule as applied creates a poli-
cy of default disclosure in agencies, arguably increasing the 
amount of exculpatory evidence provided to defendants, and 
 
 209. Cf. Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Inter-
play Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial 
Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1014 (2009) (indicating how government 
prosecutors are “highly motivated to avoid errors of omission,” one of which 
may include not providing material, exculpatory evidence to the defendant). 
 210. Cf. Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 
481, 513 (2009) (“If the evidence is immaterial, then by definition it will not 
create a reasonable doubt, and therefore its disclosure will not thwart the gov-
ernment’s case against the defendant.”). 
 211. See supra note 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 212. See NLRB. v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 
1970) (“It is well settled that parties to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings 
are not entitled to pre-trial discovery as a matter of constitutional right.” (cita-
tions omitted)).  
 213. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (holding that case 
law does not support a “constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery”); 
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (“[T]he Due Process Clause has 
little to say regarding the amount of discovery which [criminal] parties must 
be afforded . . . .”). 
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thereby potentially increasing the chance of a fair trial. This 
increased disclosure would also not unduly frustrate agency en-
forcement, because Brady is limited by sound restrictions on its 
application. 
  CONCLUSION   
The quilt work of discovery rights across federal adminis-
trative agencies reflects both a great amount of freedom and a 
substantial divergence in due process protections. Understand-
ably, agencies adopt various procedural rules to deal with the 
varying gravity of proceedings before them. However, the great 
degree of variation between agencies on discovery rights—
rights fundamental to the accused—creates its own inherent 
inequity. As federal agencies take on more responsibilities, ex-
panding their enforcement potential, a strong argument arises 
for a concomitant increase in procedural protections. Federal 
government civil and criminal attorneys operate using different 
procedural rules. Yet, no matter how benign the penalty, or 
how inconsequential the offense, the civil government attorney 
serves the same cause of justice and the same public interest as 
his criminal analogue. Thus, the same procedural rules should 
bind both.  
For these reasons, administrative agencies should adopt a 
constitutionally derived Brady disclosure standard. Grounding 
this standard in the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment pro-
tections of due process ensures that no agency can dismiss 
Brady disclosure from their formal judicial proceedings out-
right. The Brady rule has the potential to be both a procedural 
device and a general guidepost for agency enforcement attor-
neys’ discretion. By creating a robust, default standard of dis-
closure, the government lawyer moves toward the standard of 
justice seeker, and away from that of the partisan adversary—a 
move demanded of her by professional code and public interest. 
By doing so, the regulatory system increases the confidence of 
citizen-defendant and citizen alike so that, regardless of out-
come, justice is the ultimate victor. 
